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This chapter explores the political economy of agricultural trade protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 1 .1 portrays the impact of government intervention in support of agricultural and non-agricultural products by governments in different regions of the globe. 1 In devising these measures, World Bank researchers calculated for a sample of agricultural and non-agricultural commodities the degree to which government policies -tariffs, subsidies, or currency distortions --led to a separation of domestic from world market prices. 2 The measures represent un-weighted averages. When greater than 0, they indicate that government policies favor farming; when below, that their policies favor other sectors.
As indicated in Figure 1 .1, governments in Africa, like those elsewhere, have adopted more neutral policies over time. Increasingly their policies impact farming and other industries in an even-handed manner. And yet, compared to those in other regions, they have and continue to alter prices in ways that discriminate against farming.
If only because they are distinctive, agricultural policies in Africa warrant further attention. In this chapter we therefore describe the levels of protection in our sample of African countries (Table A .1) and the manner in which they vary; and, drawing from the literature on the political economy of agriculture, advance and test a series of explanations for the patterns we observe.
1 Each figure depicts a locally-weighted kernel regression of the indicator against time. 2 See Appendix 1 for specific definitions of these indicators.
Description
Agricultural policies in Africa vary by region and time period.
Regional Differences
In their recent study of Africa's economic performance in its first fifty years of independence (Ndulu, Collier et al. 2007 ) stress the importance of differentiating between countries whose economies are resource rich, landlocked, or coastal. These economies behave as if possessing different production functions, they argue, and attempts to account for Africa's growth performance gain in explanatory power when taking this heterogeneity into account.
As depicted in Figure 2 .1, while governments in our sample set of countries have tended to intervene in ways that lower the prices of agricultural exportables relative to importables, in recent years, those in landlocked countries tend to exhibit the least bias against agricultural trade while those in coastal states tend to exhibit the greatest. The data in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that the governments of resource rich countries tend to provide the most favorable policy environment for producers of both food and cash crops; 3 the governments of landlocked countries tend to impose the least. As shown in Figure 2 .4, while governments in all three types of the countries discriminate against agriculture, those in landlocked countries consistently discriminate the most severely while those that govern countries that are resource rich discriminate the least. Governments in coastal economies consistently fall between these two extremes. Constructed for each decade since the 1970s, the two-by-two matrices trace changes at the country level. In each matrix, cells to the left of zero on the horizontal axis (TBI) reflect an antiagricultural trade bias, while cells below zero on the vertical axis (RRA) reflect an antiagriculture bias. The array lends itself to the following characterization:
Temporal Variation
In the 1970s, nearly every country in the sample implemented policies that were both anti-agriculture and anti-trade. 4 The dispersion of trade bias was relatively greater than the dispersion of relative rates of assistance to agricultural as opposed to non-agricultural commodities. Over time, the country averages tended to converge, with the degree of convergence in trade bias exceeding that in the bias against agriculture. Despite these changes, no countries emerged as both pro-agriculture and pro-agricultural trade by the end of the sample period. Indeed, most remained in the cell that captures biases against both agriculture and agricultural trade.
In the sections that follow, we seek to explain these patterns.
Theoretical Setting
In accounting for variation in agricultural policies, researchers tend to focus on the level of development, as signified by the degree of structural transformation and corresponding differences in the level of per capita income (Kuznets 1966; Chenery and Taylor 1968) . When doing so, many highlight the paradoxical position of agriculture in the political economy of development: When agriculture composes the single largest sector of the economy and farmers the single largest category in the labor force, then governments tend to manipulate prices in ways that lower the incomes of farmers; when, however, agriculture forms but a small portion of the GDP and farming a miniscule portion of the labor force, then governments tend to adopt policies that favor the fortunes of farmers. As we commonly assume that political power tends to derive from income and numbers; the relationship between the level of development and the nature of government policy therefore poses a paradox -one that is fundamental in the political economy of development.
To unravel this paradox, most turn to Engel's law, which holds that for a given rate of increase in consumer income, there will be a less than proportionate rate of increase in the portion of income spent on food. The empirical relationship between average income and the size of the agricultural sector conforms to this regularity. And so too would the reversal in government policy: When people are poor and spend a large portion of their incomes on food, they demand that governments protect their interests by adopting policies that lower the costs of food; as incomes improve and food forms a smaller portion of the consumption bundle, however, pressures for governments to lower food prices would tend to decline (Bates and Rogerson 1980; Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986; Lindert 1991 ).
Our sample is drawn from the lower portion of the global distribution of income and, as seen in Table A2 , the within sample variance is low. By this standard model, our sample set of countries should therefore exhibit a common preference for policies that favor the interests of consumers. As we have seen, however, variation around this common tendency remains. By controlling the impact of per capita income, as it were, our data thus afford us the opportunity to explore the relationship between policy choice and factors left out of the standard account.
Our Arguments
One source of differences within our sample is political institutions. As changes in institutions mark the course of the recent history of Africa, they help to account for variations in policies over time. Differences in natural endowments constitute a second source of variation, with some being richly endowed and others not and many containing both rich regions and poor. Not being time varying, differences in these characteristics help to account for cross-country differences in agricultural policies. They do so, we argue, by influencing the politics of redistribution and revenue extraction, both of which of shape the choice of public policies, particularly toward cash crops for export.
Political Institutions
By lobbying or voting, citizens affect the policy choices of governments: The size of the rural sector affects the way in which farmers can employ these channels.
Lobbying
When the rural population constitutes a large percentage of the national population, then agricultural production tends to lie in the hands of a large number of small producers, dispersed throughout the countryside. As no single producer can influence government policy, and as organizing so large and diverse a population is costly, the incentives to lobby are weak. In countries with large agricultural populations, agriculture should therefore constitute an ineffective interest group. In addition, when the portion of the population in agriculture is large, that which is urban is small. The number of consumers would then tend to be small and they would be spatially concentrated. Consumers would therefore hold a relative advantage as lobbyists in countries with large agricultural populations. We therefore expect governments in countries with large agricultural sectors to adopt relatively adverse policies toward farming (Olson 1971; Bates 1981) .
Voting
The very factors -size and dispersal -that render farmers weak lobbyists can render them powerful in electoral settings, however (Varshney 1995; Bates 2007a; Bates 2007b In the sections that follow, we present statistical evidence relating the governments' choice of policy to 1) the size of the rural sector, as measured by the share of the population that dwells in rural areas; and 2) to changes in the nature of political institutions, and in particular to the presence or absence of party competition in the selection of the head of state.
Regional Redistribution
As noted by , a larger portion of Africa's economies are based upon the extraction of natural resources than is the case in other regions of the world. One result is regional inequality. While in advanced industrial societies the politics of inequality takes the form of class conflict, in Africa, it often assumes the form of regional conflict.
Roughly 80% of Africa's economies possess regions that appear significantly more prosperous than others, 5 and in roughly 70% of these cases, these regions include producers of cash crops. Examples would include the coffee industry in the relatively wealthy Central Province, Kenya, or the cocoa industry in the rich central districts of Ghana. Such regions may offer targets for those seeking resources to distribute to the poorer portions of the nation.
The impact of pressures for the regional redistribution of income depends, however, upon the regional distribution of power. In places such as Kenya, when the head of state, Jomo Kenyatta, was from the agriculturally productive Central Province, he marshaled the power of the national government to defend the province's interests and resisted efforts to tax export agriculture (Bates 1989) . In contrast, the political leadership in neighboring Tanzania came from the poor, semi-arid zones of the country, and employed the power of the state to tax regions, such as Kilimanjaro, made wealthy from the production of cash crops. Policies toward cash crops thus depend not only on regional differences in income but also upon the regional allocation of power.
In the sections that follow, we explore statistical evidence for these arguments.
The Revenue Imperative
For many nations in Africa, agriculture constitutes the largest portion of the economy and agricultural commodities figure prominently among the goods traded. And for most African countries, trade taxes constitute the single largest share of public revenues. Insofar as governments seek to raise revenues, they are therefore likely to tax agriculture. Only when other major sources of revenues -such as mineral or petroleum deposits --are available could we expect governments to deviate from this pattern. Governments endowed with ample revenues, moreover, are better able to fund programs that would enable them to lower prices for consumers. We should therefore expect them to attempt to a greater degree than others to adopt policies designed to lower the domestic price of food crops.
Summary
Based on the preceding discussion, our expectations therefore are that: 1) agricultural taxation will increase with the rural population share;
2) electoral competition will mitigate the negative effects of rural population share;
3) the presence of an economically privileged region, all else being equal, will reduce support (increase taxation) for cash crops; 4) the presence of a president from a privileged region will mitigate the negative effects of the existence of a privileged region for cash crops; 5) resource-rich countries will impose less taxation (increase nominal rates of assistance) on agricultural exportables and intervene more vigorously to lower the prices of agricultural importables by comparison with prices in international markets.
Parametric and Semi-parametric Regression Results
This section tests these hypotheses, using both parametric and non-parametric methods. Of central interest are the correlates of the relative rates of assistance for agriculture versus nonagriculture (RRA) - Table 4 .1 -and the nominal rates of assistance for agricultural importables - Table 4 .2--and exportables -- Table 4 .3.
Each table reports four sets of estimates, two (in columns 1 and 2) drawn from OLS models (with and without an interaction between rural population share and electoral competition); one drawn from a random effects model (column 3); and the last drawn from a system GMM model (column 4). The models include several control variables: per capita income (in logs), the extent of arable land, and the geographical situation of the country, with coastal location serving as the reference category.
Before commenting on the tests of our arguments, we first note the coefficients on the control variables. Those in Table 4 .1 and 4.2 confirm the absence of a relationship between the measure of per capita income, relative rates of assistance, and nominal rates of assistance for importables, most of which are food. In Table 4 .3, by contrast, the coefficient on income is positive and significant in all models, indicating that, as will be discussed, the political economy of export crops differs from that of food crops. Consistent with Figure 2 .4, the regressions in Table 4 .1 indicate that landlocked countries substantially favor the interests of other sectors over those of agriculture. In addition, we find (in Table 4 .2) that resource rich countries tend to lower the domestic price of importables, i.e. food, by comparison with the policy stance assumed in coastal economies. Viewing the share of land that is arable as a proxy for the overall importance of farming, the results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 also suggest that the policy orientation of governments towards agriculture does indeed vary positively with the magnitude of this measure.
Rural Population Share and Political Institutions
We have argued that collective action on the part of farmers becomes increasingly difficult the greater their numbers, but that electoral competition transforms numbers into a political advantage. We thus expect government policies toward agriculture to become more adverse to the interests of producers as rural dwellers form a greater share of the population, with this effect being conditional on the nature of the party system.
As an indicator of the country's party system, we employ a measure contrived by Ferree and Singh (2002) Level 5 --Multiple parties were also able to contest the executive elections Level 6 --Candidates from more than one party competed in executive elections, but the President won more than 75% of the vote Level 7 --Candidates from more than one party competed in executive elections, but the President won less than 75% of the vote.
We deem a party system competitive when the EIEC score is greater than 6. Note that we omit all consideration of the "quality" of electoral competition, including whether elections have been deemed "free and fair."
As can be seen in Table A where y it is one of our key policy indicators for country i in year t, Rurpopshare is the share of a country's population living in rural areas, X is a vector of the control variables from our baseline specification, and ν i captures unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects. The interaction term in equation (1) requires that we evaluate a linear combination of coefficients (γ 1 +γ 3 * Rurpopshare) in order to assess the impact of electoral competition (which we will evaluate at low and high levels of rural population share), and (γ 2 +γ 3 ) to assess the impact of rural population share when the electoral system is competitive. In selected cases, we also present semi-parametric results for key explanatory variables. For each LHS indicator we begin by excluding the interaction term from equation (1) while still allowing the measures of rural population and electoral competition to enter separately.
In order to assess the robustness of our estimates, we employ a series of estimators to analyze this specification. We begin by employing OLS, initially constraining 0 3 = γ , then including the interaction term in our fully-specified model. 6 We then exploit the panel structure of our data by employing to additional estimators. Most of the identifying variation lies in the cross-sectional dimension of the data: the "within" standard deviation in rural population share in our sample is only 3.6, as compared with the "between" variation of 10.7, relative to the mean of 70.55. As the fixed-effects estimator depends solely on within country variation, we therefore employ a random effects estimator -a choice supported by the Hausman test. Lastly, given the tendency for hysteresis in policy choice, we also employ the system GMM dynamic panel estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) . Use of the GMM estimator helps to alleviate concerns with endogeneity that might arise were rural population shares and the adoption of competitive electoral systems may depend on factors that influence the dependent variable as well, and that had been excluded from the model. Table 4 .1 presents our results for RRA. In both the random effects and GMM models, the existence of competitive elections (controlling for average rural population share) is significantly associated with policy support for agriculture. As expected, the point estimate for the impact of rural population share is negative in all models; it is not statistically different from zero, however. Adding the interaction term permits a more nuanced analysis: At high levels of rural population share (85%, as compared with 50%), 7 in the OLS and RE models, electoral competition bears a positive and significant relationship with policy choices that favor the agricultural sector. While the coefficient for the GMM estimate does not significantly differ from 0, it is greater than the effect of party competition on policy choice at low levels of rural population share by a margin of 23% (P = 0.024), based on the GMM estimate.
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To probe these relationships more deeply, we relax that assumption of linearity and estimate semi-parametric (or "partially-linear") models of the form: 
Nominal Rate of Assistance to Agricultural Importables
Consistent with our hypotheses, we find in Table 4 .2 that trade policy support for agricultural importables -largely consisting of food crops --declines as a function of rural population share. 7 Recall that the sample mean is roughly 75%. 8 The bottom rows of each table describe "total effects." The total effect of rural population share with competitive elections (e.g., the partial derivative of the regression with respect to rural population share) asks whether the slope coefficient of rural population changes when there is party competition. Conversely, the total effect of party competition (e.g., the partial derivative of the regression with respect to party competition) asks whether the shift effect of party competition varies with the rural population share.
When the dummy variable for party competition enters without the interaction term (controlling for average rural population share in column 1), it increases the nominal rate of assistance for agricultural importables by nearly 20 percent. When interacted directly with rural population share, the results reveal that the effect of electoral competition on nominal protection for agricultural importables depends critically on the level of rural population share. While not statistically different from zero at relatively low levels of rural population share, we find that electoral competition transforms high values of rural population share from a political liability into a political asset. At a high level of rural population share (85%), the estimates indicate a substantial and statistically significant benefit from electoral competition in all three models. Table 4 .3 suggests that rural population share bears no relationship with the level of nominal protection of agricultural exportables. As seen at the bottom of Table 4 .3, the data suggest that at high levels of rural population share, producers of agricultural exportables do benefit from electoral competition, but that the impact is small and of little significance. Figure 4 .3 confirms the first finding -that nominal assistance for agricultural exportables in the absence of competitive elections is not a function of rural population share -while suggesting that party competition can reduce the burdens based on agriculture when the rural share of the population is high.
Nominal Rate of Assistance for Agricultural Exportables
In important respects, then, the findings for importables and exportables differ, which suggests that the political forces that shape government policies toward them differ as well. It is our argument, further elaborated in the following section, that the politics of cash crops is shaped by the forces of regionalism and revenue extraction to a greater degree than are the politics of food crops.
Regional Inequality and Presidential Origin
Data collected by the authors indicate that most African states contain rich regions and poor and that in roughly 70% of the instances in which the country is marked by regional inequality, the region is prosperous in part because of the production of cash crops. Particularly in the case of cash crops, then, we would expect the politics of agricultural policy to be shaped by the politics of regional inequality, as poor regions seek to extract resources from rich, while rich regions seek to defend against their efforts.
To illustrate, consider the historic rivalries between the socialist systems of Tanzania and Ghana on the one hand and the "capitalist" systems of Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire on the other. 9 In Tanzania, President Julius Nyerere drew his political support from the cities and the semi-arid lowlands; in Ghana, President Kwame Nkrumah drew his from the cities and the semi-arid north.
Both seized a major portion of the revenues generated by the export of cash crops -cocoa and coffee, respectively -in order to finance projects designed to benefit their constituencies. In their The intuition imparted by these cases informs the models reported in Table 4 where X includes all variables from the previous specifications.
In columns 1-2 of Barkan (1994) . 10 Following the rapid rise of cocoa and coffee prices in the 1970s, Houphouet Boigny did launch a series of efforts to promote the fortunes of the north. Subsequent events suggest that the wisdom of these efforts, as the diverging fortunes of the two regions exacerbated political tensions in Cote d'Ivoire. 11 See Appendix 1 for the specific definition of this "cash-food bias indicator (CFBI)." See Table A .3 for construction of the indicators of nominal rates of assistance for cash and food crops.
coefficients are negative, although only the first is statistically significant. When the president is from the privileged region, however, then the support for cash crops rises; the coefficients on the respective indicator are positive and significant. And as seen in the last row of columns 1 and 2, when the privileged region produces cash crops and the president is from that region, the coefficients are again positive and significant.
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In columns 3-6, we explore the correlates of the respective components of the CFBI index. In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the nominal rate of assistance for cash crops; in columns 5-6, the nominal rate of assistance for food crops. For each dependent variable, we report estimates based upon ordinary least squares and GMM models-the last to enable us to control for the impact of hysteresis in policy choice.
The coefficients in columns 3-6 reconfirm that the politics surrounding cash crops differ from those surrounding food crops. For food crops (columns 5-6), the larger the share of the population in agriculture, the greater the tendency of the governments to intervene in ways that lower domestic prices relative to those prevailing in global markets; in addition, governments tend to alter this policy when they must secure electoral majorities in order to secure power.
Neither tendency characterizes the treatment of cash crops, however (columns 3-4). Rather, policies toward cash crops appear to be shaped by the politics of regional inequality. In states in which cash crops are grown in "privileged regions," the government intervenes in ways that lower the incomes of farmers. The bias is reversed, however, when the President is from that region (as seen in the evaluation of the partial derivative in the last row of columns 3 and 4).
Revenue Imperative
Policies toward agriculture are also affected by the manner in which governments secure their revenues. Governments in Africa have long employed marketing boards and other instruments to extract revenues from the exports of cash crops; and they have expended revenues in efforts to 12 The bottom row of Table 4 .4 provides the partial derivative of the regression with respect to the dummy variable indicating that the president is from a privileged region. The question addressed in the last row is thus whether the shift effect of presidential origin differs when there is a privileged cash crop-producing region. (The second to last row of Table 4 .4 provides estimates of the partial derivative with respect to the dummy variable indicating the existence of a cash crop region when the president is from a privileged region.) accommodate the interests of domestic consumers of food crops (Bates 1981; Krueger, Schiff et al. 1992 ).
The coefficients on "cash region" in Table 4 .4 are negative and significant in most models (columns 1-4). While consistent with a theory of revenue generation, these findings could also indicate efforts at regional re-distribution. The coefficients on "resource rich" dummy variable are less ambiguous. They suggest that governments with alternative sources of revenues do not differentially tax cash crops (see columns 3 and 4), but tend to favor them relative to food crops (columns 1 and 2) by conferring substantial subsidies on the consumers of food (columns 5 and 6).
While we might expect governments with additional sources of revenue to reduce the pressures they place on agriculture, the results thus suggest the contrary. As seen in columns 3 and 4, governments from resource rich economies treat export agriculture no differently than do those in the coastal economies lacking such resources. But, as seen in columns 5 and 6, they confer significantly greater levels of consumer subsidies, thus lowering the domestic prices for food crops. Governments that are wealthier because of presiding over economies abundantly endowed with natural resources are thus not inclined to reduce the burdens they place on farmers. Instead, they appear to employ these resources further to underpin the fortunes of the consumers of farm products.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have explored patterns of variation in the content of agricultural policies in Africa. We have looked at the impact of the government's need for revenues, the incentives for farmers to lobby, and their capacity to affect electoral outcomes. We have also explored the political impact of regional inequality, especially insofar as it is generated by cash crop production. These factors operate in ways that deepen our appreciation of the political roots of agricultural policies. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Year dummies not reported. 
RRA
Relative rates of assistance. Classifying commodities as originating from the agricultural or non-agricultural sector, the RRA is based upon the the ratio between the average rate of assistance (weighted by the relative value of the industry's share of total production) of agricultural and non-agricultural tradables. Values less than 0 suggest policy discrimination against agriculture.
Anti-trade bias
Classifying each industry as import competing, non-tradable, or exportable, the measure of trade bias is the weighted average of the nominal rate of assistance for importables relative to that for exportables. Values greater than zero indicate an anti-trade bias.
Competitive
A government is said to be competitively elected when the incumbent head of state achieved office by contesting an election in elections she faced a rival who was sponsored by an organized party and received less than 75% of the vote.
Rural population share
The percent of population living in rural areas.
Real GDP per capita Average real income, computed in constant 2000 US dollars.
Landlocked Countries whose borders fail to touch the sea.
Coastal
Countries whose borders touch the sea.
Resource rich
A country is classified as resource-rich starting in the first year (i) current rents from energy, minerals and forests exceed 5% of Gross National Income (GNI); (ii) a forward moving average of these rents exceeds 10% of GNI; and (iii) the share of primary commodities in exports exceeds 20% for at least a 5-year period following this initial year.
Arable land share
The share of total land surface suitable for cropping.
Cashcrop privileged The existence within a country of a region of significantly greater than average wealth based on cash crop region production.
President from Takes the value 1 when the country has a privileged region and the president is a native of that region privileged region
Appendix: Policy Indicators
The principal indicators of trade interventions that we examine in this chapter draw on the new data set constructed through the World Bank's Distortions to Agricultural Incentives Project.
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We propose models to explain direct agricultural distortions -specifically nominal rates of assistance to agricultural tradables relative to non-agricultural tradables (e.g., the relative rate of assistance), as well as the nominal rates of assistance to agricultural importables and agricultural exportables (and their ratio, known as the Trade Bias Indicator).
For each of these commodity aggregates (x), the nominal rate of assistance when an ad valorem tariff is the sole intervention is calculated as:
t m is tariff rate, E is the nominal exchange rate, and P is the dollar-denominated world price of the commodity. Anderson, et. al. provide a detailed discussion of how this basic formula is modified to incorporate additional distortions, such taxes and subsidies on domestic production of the relevant commodities.
We also examine key ratios among these indicators. The relative rate of assistance Our analysis also makes reference to nominal rates of assistance to food crops and cash crops. To construct these aggregates, we use the nominal rates of assistance calculated by the World Bank data set, weighting within each category by the share in the value of production of each commodity within that category. Our food crop aggregate includes cassava, maize, millet, tubers, sorghum, wheat, rice, and yams. Our cash crop aggregate includes cotton, cocoa, coffee, nuts, sugar, tobacco, and tea. Analogous to the TBI, we calculate a "cash-food bias indicator" 
